The resilience of a key pre-distribution scheme depends on the size of the key pool that the scheme uses for distributing keys among sensor nodes. We show that, when the key distribution is near-uniform, the maximum size a key pool that can be used by any key pre-distribution scheme is upper-bounded by s 2 p , where s is the amount of space available on a sensor node for storing keys and p is the probability that two sensor nodes share a common key. We define the notion of utilization factor of a key pre-distribution scheme to measure how effective the scheme is in using the largest key pool available at its disposal for fixed values of s and p. We explore the effect of the utilization factor of a scheme on its resilience.
Introduction
We investigate the relationship between various parameters of a key pre-distribution scheme, namely (1) s: the amount of space available on a sensor node for storing keys, (2) p: the probability that two sensor nodes share a common key, (3) N : the number of sensor nodes in the system, and (4) K:
the size of the key pool used by a key distribution scheme. We show that, when the key distribution is near uniform and s (N − 1)p, the size of the key pool that any scheme can use for distributing keys among sensor nodes is upper bounded by a function of s and p. Specifically, we demonstrate that the upper bound is given by s 2 /p.
Based on the upper bound established, we define the notion of utilization factor of a key predistribution scheme. The utilization factor of a scheme, denoted by ρ, is given by the ratio of the size of the actual key pool used by the scheme and the maximum size of the key pool that any Symbol Meaning N number of sensor nodes in the network s amount of space available for storing keys on each sensor node p probability that two sensor nodes share a common key K size of the key pool from which keys are chosen ki i th key in the key pool fi number of sensor nodes that contain the i th key, that is, frequency of key ki µ f mean value of key frequencies
fi σ f standard deviation of key frequencies
κ f coefficient of variation of key frequencies Table 1 : Notation used in this paper scheme can use. We show that resilience of a key pre-distribution scheme depends on how effective the scheme is in utilizing the largest allowable key pool.
Estimating Bound on Key Pool Size with Near-Uniform Key Distribution
Any key distribution scheme has three main objectives. First, the scheme should maximize the probability that two sensor nodes share a common key if they find themselves to be neighbors of each other after deployment. In the absence of any deployment knowledge, this is achieved by maximizing the probability that any two nodes share a common key. This probability is referred to as the overlap probability of the scheme [8] . The set of nodes with which a node shares at least one common key are referred to as its key-neighbors. On the other hand, the set of nodes that are within communication range of a node are referred to as its field-neighbors. Second, the scheme should minimize the damage caused to the rest of the network once a certain number of nodes have been compromised. Specifically, it should maximize the probability that a channel between two (uncompromised) nodes is still secure given that a certain number of nodes have been compromised by an adversary. This is referred to as the degree of resilience of the scheme. Third, the scheme should use as little space as possible, that is, it should be space-efficient. Sensor nodes typically have severe resource constraints and, therefore, only have limited amount of space available for storing keys.
The three requirements are somewhat conflicting with each other. For example, a scheme that guarantees that every pair of sensor nodes share a common key and is perfectly resilient requires that a sensor node has enough space to store one unique key for each node in the network. On the other hand, a scheme that requires only one key to be stored on each node and still guarantees that every pair of sensor nodes share a common key has zero resiliency (master key based approach).
Finally, a scheme that is perfectly resilient and requires only one key per node has extremely low overlap probability-a node shares a key with only one other node.
It has been observed by other researchers that, given the amount of space available on a sensor node and a desired overlap probability, the resilience of the network can be increased by increasing the size of the key pool from which keys are chosen. We ask the following fundamental questions.
Is there a bound on the maximum size of key pool that can be used for selecting keys? If yes, what is the exact nature of the bound? We show that, if the key distribution among sensor nodes is almost uniform, then the maximum key pool size that can be used by any scheme depends only on two factors, namely the amount of space available on a sensor node for storing keys and the overlap probability, irrespective of the number of sensor nodes in the network.
Our analysis assumes the keys are distributed almost uniformly among sensor nodes. This is because, intuitively, uniform key distribution improves the resilience of the network. If some key occurs more frequently than others in sensor nodes, then, once a node containing that key has been compromised, a large fraction of channels between sensor nodes, which themselves have not been compromised so far, may be compromised as well. Our assumption is consistent with the assumption made by other researchers (e.g., [3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12] ).
Let N denote the number of sensor nodes in the system. We assume that N is sufficiently large so that N − 1 ≈ N . Let s denote the amount of space (or memory) available on each sensor node for storing keys. We use K to refer to the size of the key pool. For a key k i in the key pool, let f i denote the number of sensor nodes in the network that carry the key k i . Clearly, for key to be useful, that is, it can be used to establish at least one common channel, f i is at least 2. Hereafter, in this paper, we assume that each key is useful. Therefore,
We have,
Note that bound in (2) holds irrespective of whether key distribution is uniform or non-uniform.
We now derive a tighter upper bound on key pool size that is independent of the number of sensor nodes in the network. Let C be the number of pairs of sensor nodes that share a common key and p be the overlap probability, that is,
Assume that all sensor nodes are identical in the sense that they have approximately the same number of key-neighbors. Therefore each sensor node has approximately (N − 1)p key-neighbors.
Typically, in a sensor network system, a sensor node is expected to have much larger number of neighbors than the amount of space it has for storing keys. Therefore, we assume the following:
We refer to the ratio s (N − 1)p as the space-constraint factor (SCF) and denote it by γ. If
, then a sensor node can use a different key to encrypt the channel with each of its key-neighbor (provided the key-neighbor is also its field-neighbor). As a result, the resulting scheme has perfect resilience [4] . However, we expect the space-constraint factor to be much smaller than 1 in practice. Intuitively, the space-constraint factor measures the extent by which the space on a sensor node is short of the space required to achieve perfect resiliency.
Remark 1
The assumption that all sensor nodes have same number of key-neighbors is not really necessary. Let s j denote the amount of key space available on a sensor node sn j , and let n j denote the number of its key-neighbors. We use p j to denote the overlap probability for sensor node sn j , that is, n j = (N − 1)p j . We define s avg to be the average amount of key space available on a sensor node, that is,
s j . Likewise, we define p avg to the average overlap probability, that is, In other words, (4) still holds provided s avg and p avg are used instead of s and p. In this case, we define space-constraint factor to be the ratio
Observe that key k i can be used to establish at most f i (f i −1)/2 secure channels in the network.
Therefore,
In our analysis, we use the following well-known equality in statistics:
where µ f and σ f denote the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of key frequencies. The ratio κ f = σ f µ f is known as coefficient of variation and, in our case, measures "variability" in key distribution. If the key distribution is almost uniform, that is, all key frequencies are close to the mean value, then κ f ≈ 0 provided µ f 1. Now, we have,
⇒ { using (1) and (6) }
Remark 2 If all sensor nodes are not identical in the sense that either they have different amounts of space available for storing keys or their overlap probabilities are different, then it can be shown that:
Therefore the upper bound of K still holds albeit with s and p replaced with s avg and p avg . 2
Note that γ lies in the range (0, 1]. In fact, in real life, we expect γ to be much smaller than 1.
For example, for N = 10, 000, p = 0.2 and s = 100, γ = s (N − 1)p = 0.05 ≈ 0. It turns out that if the key distribution is almost uniform, then γ and µ f are closely related. Again, assume that each sensor node has approximately the same number of key-neighbors. Each key k i on a sensor node can be used by the node to establish at most f i − 1 secure channels with its neighbors, which is approximately equal to µ f − 1. We have,
In case γ 1, µ f 2. This in turn implies that, when the key distribution is almost uniform, κ f 1, where κ f is the coefficient of variation. Therefore, we have,
We denote the expression s 2 p by K max . Intuitively, K max denotes the maximum size of the key pool that can be used for a given value of s and p. We refer to the ratio of the actual key pool size to the maximum key pool size as the utilization factor (UF) and denote it by ρ.
Remark 3 Again, the assumption that all sensor nodes have approximately the same number of key-neighbors is not necessary. Let K j denote the set of keys stored on the sensor node sn j . We have,
⇒ { key distribution is almost uniform which implies that f i ≈ µ f and, also,
Therefore the relationship between µ f and γ still holds. 2
Bound on Key Pool Size when Deployment Knowledge is Used
Du et al. [5] and Liu et al. [10, 11] show that the resilience of the network can be improved substantially (at least against random attacks by an adversary) by using deployment knowledge at the time of distributing keys among sensor nodes. Deployment knowledge basically limits the number of sensor nodes that can be neighbors of a given sensor node in the field. The main reason for improvement in resiliency is that deployment knowledge allows a much bigger key pool size to be used than is otherwise possible. Does it mean that the upper bound derived in the previous section does not hold when deployment knowledge is used during key distribution? The answer is no. The upper bound holds as long as key distribution is almost uniform and space constraint factor is small (that is, coefficient of variation is small). However, the reason for the improvement in resilience can be explained as follows. Let η denote the fraction of sensor nodes that can be neighbors of a given sensor node based on the deployment knowledge. We refer to these sensor nodes as region-neighbors of the given sensor node. Further, let p local denote the probability that a sensor node shares a common key with its region-neighbor. We refer to p local as the local overlap probability. Therefore the probability that any two sensor nodes share a common key, which we refer to as the global overlap probability, is given by p global = η p local . (We assume that two sensor nodes may possibly share a common key only if they are region-neighbors of each other.) In the absence of any deployment knowledge, η = 1 implying that p global = p local . Based on the analysis in the previous section, the size of key pool that can be used is upper bounded by:
For fixed values of s and p local , the size of the key pool can be increased by decreasing η, which, in turn, depends on the extent of the deployment knowledge. Therefore, deployment knowledge helps improve resiliency of the network by decreasing η which, in turn, decreases p global . Reducing p global increases the size of the key pool that can be used for assigning keys to sensor nodes.
Effect of Utilization Factor on Network Resiliency
Suppose an adversary has compromised w randomly selected sensor nodes, where w ≥ 1. Therefore all keys stored in these nodes have been revealed to the adversary. Consider a channel c between two sensor nodes that have not been compromised. We are interested in computing the probability that the channel c has been compromised. Let A w denote the event that the adversary has compromised w sensor nodes at random. Further, let B i denote the event that c uses key k i for encryption and let C i denote the event that the key k i has been compromised. Du et al. show in [6] that, when key distribution is uniform, the probability that channel c has been compromised given that w sensor nodes, chosen at random, have been compromised already is given by:
If w is small compared to N , and key distribution is almost uniform, then:
Using (1)
Combining (9), (10) and (11), we obtain,
In other words, probability that a channel between two uncompromised sensor nodes has been compromised is directly proportional to the number of nodes that have been compromised and the overlap probability. Further, it is inversely proportional to the utilization factor and the amount of key space available on a sensor node. Consequently, for fixed values of s, p and w, the resilience of the network can be increased by increasing the utilization factor of the key distribution scheme.
Let ν denote the fraction of nodes that have been compromised, that is, ν = w N . Let A ν denote the event that an adversary has compromised ν fraction of the nodes. We have,
In our analysis of resiliency so far, we have implicitly assumed that a unit of key space corresponds to one symmetric cryptographic key. Once even a single node containing a key is compromised, all channels encrypted using that key are compromised as well. However, there are other cryptographic schemes in which one unit of key space corresponds to a row of size λ + 1 of a matrix [1] or a polynomial of degree λ + 1 [2] . These schemes satisfy the desirable property that the scheme is completely secure as long as λ or fewer nodes have been compromised. Further, once λ + 1 nodes have been compromised, the scheme is completely broken, that is, the adversary can decrypt all messages encrypted using the cryptographic scheme. Du et al. [6] and Liu et al. [12] describe key distribution approaches in which the key pool consists of multiple instances of these cryptographic schemes (matrix or polynomial-based). Each sensor node carries a subset of these instances. Note that the upper bound established on key pool size in Section 2 is applicable to such key pre-distribution approaches as well. For such approaches, s is taken to be the number of instances that can be stored on a sensor node. The total amount of space used by a sensor node for key establishment is then given by m = (λ + 1)s (and not s as in the case of simple key-based cryptographic scheme). Du et al. show in [6] that, with matrix-based scheme, the probability that a channel between two uncompromised nodes has been compromised given that w sensor nodes have been compromised already remains close to zero for relatively large values of w. Moreover, there is a value of w after which the probability starts increasing almost exponentially. 
Note that the value of the breaking point is directly proportional to s, λ and ρ and inversely proportional to p. Again, as before, for fixed values of s, p and λ, the value at which the breaking point occurs can be increased by increasing the utilization factor of the key (or instance) distribution scheme.
In both cases, the resilience of the network depends on the size of the key pool used by the distribution scheme. Therefore it becomes significant to design key distribution schemes that use as large key pool as possible for given values of s and p.
